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I. Introduction 
A market can be imperfectly competitive for a variety of reasons; in the 
context of an auction or a contract awarding, imperfections may stem from the 
limited number of bidders involved. Bidders, recognizing that their behavior 
(or that of others) can affect the market outcome, may adopt strategies that 
are unlikely to lead to a Pareto efficient allocation. Such inefficiencies can 
occur in the absence of any collusive behavior on the part of bidders. If 
barriers to bid entry are removed, and bidders are sufficiently homogeneous, 
the likelihood increases that bids will reflect full (private) valuations of 
the auctioned goods. Under these conditions Pareto efficient allocations would 
be guided by a set of minimum prices: a "sale to the highest bidder" would be 
transacted at a price approximate to the valuation of the second highest bidder, 
and contracts would be awarded at the competitive supply price. Even when the 
number of bidders is restricted, auction procedures can be adopted which will 
insure efficiency to a degree. This efficiency is achieved by changing the moti-
vations of the available bidders, and by providing incentives for bidders to 
reveal their full valuations of the objects being auctioned. This paper de-
scribes a set of auction procedures which achieve these ends. 
Since auctions can be viewed as n person noncooperative games, some kinds 
of auctions call for strategic bidding based on the expected actions of others 
as well as one's own valuations. In these game situations, rational bidding 
entails the assessment of probable bids by others, and the balancing of the po-
tential gain of a lower successful bid against the reduced (subjective) prob-
ability of success. These elements characterize what we call probabilistic 
auctions. 
Much of the research relating to auctions has focused on these strategic 
aspects of particular bidding situations. Some sharp results have emerged 
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from this line of inquiry (e.g., Vickrey [12], and Griesmer, Shubik and Levitan 
[5], but it is fair to say that very modest assumptions about players' (bid-
ders') subjective beliefs give way to game characterizations that are quite 
2 
complicated or analytically intractable. 
This paper is concerned with the solution properties of deterministic 
auctions. Here, unlike in probabilistic auctions, a bidder only needs to know 
his own valuation of an object to submit a rational bid. Indeed, such bids will 
equal one's full valuations of objects, unless the bidder is constrained by his 
resource limitations. As might be expected, the auction rules that establish 
transaction prices at the same time identify an auction as either probabilistic 
or deterministic. If prices are set by what we call the second bid price mech-
anism, the auction is deterministic; the resulting transaction prices are re-
ferred to as demand prices. The primarv purposes of this paper are to establish 
the importance of demand prices in auction theory and to provide solution methods 
for a variety of deterministic auctions. The formal similarities between auc-
tions and the linear assignment problem enable us to develop algorithms that 
solve for the desired commodity allocations and demand prices. 
We first present some basic properties of auctions and define different 
types of auctions according to (1) the number of kinds of commodities offered, 
and (2) the rules which determine the price and allocation of the auctioned com-
modities. Then, in Section III, we discuss efficiency criteria for auction out-
comes, and reconsider deterministic auctions as linear assignment problems. In 
Section IV we derive solutions for deterministic auctions. 
II. Auction Types 
An auction can be defined as a specialized, dated market that is governed 
by an announced set of rules and procedures. The basic asymmetry in an auction 
is that sellers determine the rules and procedures of the market and minimum 
3 , transaction prices, and thereafter act passively; buyers accept the rules and 
procedures and then bid actively to determine transaction prices. There is a 
surprisingly large variety of auction procedures in use. To establish the set-
ting for our subsequent analysis, we first offer some properties (P) of auction 
markets: 
2 
The case in which only two bidders draw a single object valuation from 
different rectangular distributions, and the highest bidder receives the award 
at a price equal to his submitted bid is analytically complex; see [5] . 
3To avoid confusion, we restrict our discussion here to the situation in 
which a higher bid dominates a lower one. Auctions where minimum bids dominate, 
such as in contract awardings, can be treated symmetrically. 
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PI The auctioned commodity (s) has individualistic characteristics 
and is in fixed supply. Usually the commodity is nonduplicable 
and "dated," e.g., antiques or securities of a particular issue. 4 
P2 Market transactions occur at a specific point in time (the auction 
date); there is no continuous, prevailing price for auctioned 
commodities. 
P3 The organization of the market is dictated by the commodity sellers 
or their agents, the "auctioneers." 
P4 Bidders are able to make personal money valuations of commodities 
(sometimes only in a probabilistic sense), and their bidding actions 
are based on these (expected) valuations. 
P5 Bids carry contractural responsibility, if accepted. This property 
is included to assure the integrity of submitted bids (and to pre-
vent bidders from bidding beyond their available resources). A 
sufficiently large penalty for reneging can be assumed to exist. 
P6 Bidders act independently and in their own self-interest. A rational 
bid in this context maximizes one's expected utility of the auction 
outcome. 
It is expositionally convenient to distinguish among auction types according to 
several characteristics (C) . 
CI. The Offering. Commodities are (usually) auctioned off in discrete units. 
An auction consists of either a single or multiple commodity offering, with 
single or multiple units of each commodity available. An oij'ect will refer to 
a single unit of some commodity. 
C2. Bidding Mode. Two basic mechanisms are used to auction commodities. The 
sealed bid method requires the submission of bids before a set deadline, after 
which the bids are revealed and ranked. In some multiple commodity or multiple 
unit auctions, bidders are free to submit several bids. The real time (pro-
gressive) auction method requires participants to bid until a transaction is 
signaled, according to the rules defining the award mode. 
C3. The Award Mode. The most distinctive characteristic of an auction is the 
way in which objects are awarded to bidders. The award mode refers to both the 
way a successful bidder is determined, and the price at which the transaction 
takes place. Two basic award modes characterize multiple unit, sealed bid auc-
tions. Such an auction is price discriminant if each successful bidder must 
Pay the price he bids. That is, if n units are available, the submitted bids 
are awarded a unit, with each unit sold at the individually bid price. In the 
event of a tie on the margin a fair coin is used to decide the awardee. 
4Supply may be fixed only in the sense of the Marshallian short run. Com-
modities may be dated only by the date of the auction itself, e.g., 91-day 
Treasury Bills. 
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Alternatively, the auction is price competitive if each successful bidder pays 
a uniform price equal to the n t h highest bid. In a single unit, sealed bid 
auction, both award modes imply a sale to the highest bidder. 
The distinction between these two award modes is more subtle in real time 
auctions. The familiar "sale to the highest bidder" auction conforms, to the 
price competitive award mode, since a successful bidder need only bid slightly 
more than any other bidder to obtain the object. The price discriminant award 
mode is conducted by first setting an arbitrarily high asking price for the 
object and allowing the price to fall steadily until a bid is made."* In this 
way a bidder can only capture some "consumer surplus" at the risk of losing the 
award. 
The award modes just described are used in most auctions, although some 
variations are used to further segment the bidder market. For example, the 
weekly U.S. Treasury Bill auction is basically a price-discriminant sealed bid 
auction, with small investors permitted to buy at the average realized price 
(so-called "noncompetitive bids"). 
The second-bid price method is a variant of the price competitive award 
mode. In single unit, sealed bid auctions, the object would be awarded to the 
highest bidder at a price equal to the second highest bid submitted. For the 
multiple unit case, the highest unsuccessful bid would determine the uniform 
transaction price. In real time bidding, the award can be made by one of two 
methods: the familiar "sale to the highest bidder" could be transacted at a 
price equal to the penultimate bid. Alternatively a modified Dutch auction pro-
cedure could be used: As the ask price falls, bidders could register bids in 
secret with the auction terminating when the first unsuccessful bid is regis-
tered. The appeal of the second bid price mode is that it eliminates any incen-
tive (in the absence of collusion) on the part of bidders to bid anything less 
than their full valuation of an object. In second bid price auctions, a bidder 
need not concern himself with the preferences and strategies of others; the 
transcation price will be independent of his bid if he is the successful bidder. 
This award mode, then, defines the class of deterministic auctions which we 
analyze in subsequent sections. 
C4. Bidder Constraints. An obvious constraint facing a bidder is the limit of 
his resources. Individual rationality (P6) precludes the submission of bids 
5This award mode has come to be known as a Dutch auction, for it is used 
in the Netherlands flower market. (See Vickrev [12]. 
6Curiously the effect of resource constraints has been ignored in previous 
treatments of auction problems. These constraints are consequential in the 
solution of deterministic auctions. 
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in excess of one's resources. In a price-discriminant auction, since a s u c c e s s -
ful bid becomes the transaction price, one's resources effectively l i m i t h i s 
bids. Similarly, in a price-competitive auction the price setting b i d d e r can 
ill afford to exceed his resource limit in view of P5. In second-bid p r x c e 
auctions, a bid in excess of one's resources introduces the probability o f 
7 
reneging. 
A second kind of constraint is a limit on the number of objects a b i d d e r 
is permitted to obtain in an auction. This constraint must be built i n t o the 
auction rules, just as "limits per customer" are stipulated in p r o m o t i o n a l sales. 
The purchase limit can stimulate competition in multiple commodity a u c t i o n s , 
wherein a resource constrained bidder can submit offers for a number o f c o m m o -
dities with the understanding that he is contractually responsible for, say, 
only one commodity. This kind of auction situation can arise naturally from 
discreteness in consumer demand, say for housing or dowried brides, or in assign-
Q 
ment problem situations. 
III. The Allocative Efficiency of Auction Procedures 
An important efficiency criterion that is applicable to any auction o u t -
come is that of Pareto optimality: Considering the entire set of b i d d e r s and 
sellers, no reallocation (and prices) of the auctioned commodities is p o s s i b l e 
that would benefit someone without imposing a loss on another. This m e a s u r e of 
efficiency is conditioned by the auction ground rules (e.g., a "one to a c u s -
tomer limit") , and generally by the resource limits of bidders and the c o d e t e r -
mination of transaction prices for all objects up for auction. For t h e seller, 
Pareto optimality implies that the transaction price is no less than h i s valu-
ation of the object (his reserve price) . For the bidders the difference between 
one's valuation of an object and its transaction price is called a s u r p l u s . For 
a successful bidder that difference is his earned or realized surplus. Multiple 
In both price-competitive and second-bid price auctions, an e x c e p t i o n a l 
case calls for rational bidding beyond resource limits. If one knows w i t h cer-
tainty that the first unsuccessful bid will exactly equal his resource l i m i t in 
the absence of his bid, he can avoid ties by bidding slightly higher. P 5 and 
P6 are intended to rule out this case. 
g 
This kind of auction game has been used on an experimental b a s i s t o assign 
teaching responsibilities to faculty in university departments. S c r i p a r e p r e -
sented to bidders on some basis, and courses are awarded to the highest bidders 
subject to teaching load limits. Unspent scrip can be accumulated w i t h o u t in-
terest. In the experiment that we are aware of the price-discriminant a w a r d 
mode was used. The second-bid price mode would have eliminated the g a m i n g a s -
pects of the auction, and some of its consumption value. A considerable amount 
of bidder collusion was in evidence. 
object auctions then can be viewed as a discrete set of choices, with the op-
portunity cost of a successful bid being the maximum surplus that could have 
been earned on an alternative choice. Pareto optimality requires that each 
9 
bidder's opportunity cost be no greater than his realized surplus. In prob-
abilistic auctions it is always rational to bid somewhat less than one's full 
valuation of an object, by an amount that is dependent on one's expectations 
of his competitors' bids. Here, miscalculations can lead to non-Pareto optimal 
outcomes. 1 0 In contrast, Pareto optimality is assured in deterministic auctions 
since submitted bids equal full valuations. 
A second efficiency issue centers around the expected transaction prices 
that would be realized under alternative auction procedures. We have seen that 
rational bidding leads to a lower registered demand schedule (the array of bids 
for any commodity) in probabilistic auctions than in deterministic auctions. 
The extent of this downward shift in demand depends on (1) the characteristics 
of the (probabilistic) auction, (2) the number and nature of bidders, and (3) 
the availability of information on (expected) bidder behavior. The simplest 
characterization of this efficiency issue asks whether seller revenue is maxi-
mized in a single commodity, multiple unit auction under the price-discriminant 
or the second-bid price award mode. The answer depends of course on the cir-
cumstances mentioned; either mode can yield a higher average price. 
This issue has produced a lively debate over the efficiency of the U.S. 
Treasury Bill auction. Advocates of the Treasury's price discriminant proce-
dure (Brimmer [2], Goldstein [4] have argued that it maximizes revenue, while 
persuasive arguments for price-competitive or determinstic-auction alternatives 
have been made on both theoretic (Friedman [3] and Smith [10]), and empirical 
(Smith [9] and Bolten [1]) grounds. Essentially, the opponents arque that 
greater revenue would be realized in a deterministic auction through increased 
bidder participation and higher individual bids. The more basic efficiency 
issue surrounding this expected revenue debate, however, involves the real re-
source cost of gathering the information required to make rational bids in 
probabilistic auctions. For even if the deterministic auction would return a 
higher average price to the Treasury, the expected cost to the bidders need not 
^For a single object auction, this implies that the person placing the 
highest value on the object is the successful bidder. 
1 0Some auction procedures insure nonoptimal allocations according to this 
criterion. For example, in sealed bid auctions of new securities in France, a 
percentage of the highest bids is rejected, and the remaining bids are fraction 
ally accepted to achieve a target (uniform) transaction price. For a fascina-
ting analysis of this auction, see McDonald and Jacquillat [7] . 
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be higher. In probabilistic auctions, bidding costs drive a wedge between ob-
ject valuations and the realized transaction prices. In the Treasury auction 
these costs are embodied in the trading specialists who bid for the bills, and 
then sell to less informed demanders in a secondary market. The elimination 
of such costs can represent a substantial efficiency gain. 
In [12, p. 28] , William Vickrey has established the efficiency of deter-
ministic auctions involving identical objects and a "one to a customer" limit: 
It is possible, by establishing in advance that the price is to be 
determined by the first rejected bid, to achieve the Pare to-optimal 
result. Moreover, in spite of this method's appearing to accord a 
lower price than necessary after the bids are in, the higher level 
of bids induced by this method results, on balance, in a price 
averaging-out at the same level as would be obtained under Dutch 
auction, individual bid pricing, or last-accepted-bid pricing methods, 
at least for cases where the bidders are symmetrical with respect to 
the a priori information which each one has about the probability dis-
tribution of the values or bids of the others. In such cases there 
is a rather strong presumption that a switch from other methods of 
negotiation to a first-rejected-bid pricing method would be to the 
long-run advantage of all concerned, the gain being derived from the 
greater certainty of obtaining a Pare to-optimal result and from the 
reduction in non-productive expenditure devoted to the sizing-up of the 
market by the bidders. To be sure, these conclusions are based on a 
model in which a high degree of rationality and sophistication is im-
puted to the bidders; nevertheless, in many markets the frequency of 
the dealings and the professional characteristics of the dealers are 
such as to make such an assumption not too far from reality; moreover, 
the change to the first-rejected-price method would substantially dimin-
ish the amount of sophistication required to achieve the optimal result. 
Vickrey [12, pp. 24,26] erroneously rejected the applicability of demand 
pricing to auctions involving dissimilar objects or to auctions where bidders 
may purchase more than one object: 
(Demand pricing) is applicable, however, only if the items are actually 
identical so that there is no problem of deciding who gets first choice, 
and no variation in the value imputed to the various items by a given 
bidder.(Further it) applies only to cases where each bidder is inter-
ested in a single unit, and there is no collusion among the bidders. 
We now present a formal analysis of deterministic auction procedures and provide 
solutions for these rejected cases. Demand prices are determined via a vari-
ation of the optimal assignment problem in linear programming• For the case in 
which bidders are restricted to the purchase of at most one object, demand 
prices will be determined when potential buyers have resource constraints. The 
solutions developed here are offered on the one hand as normative prescriptions 
for auction procedures, and on the other hand as a description of price deter-
mination in approximately competitive markets such as residential housing. 
IV. Deterministic Auction Solutions 
Deterministic auctions are formally similar to the optimal assignment prob-
lem in linear programming. Our analytic approach is first to consider an auc-
tion in which a set of bidders I place true valuations c. . on a set of distinct 
ID 
objects J, with each bidder constrained to obtain at most one object. This 
setting corresponds closely to the optimal assignment problem; we then consider 
variations of this problem that delimit the class of deterministic auctions. 
The optimal assignment problem can be written, 
(la) Max II c. . X. . 
X ij 1 3 1 3 
(lb) I X. . <_ 1 j E J 
i ^ 
(lc) I X . . <_ 1 i E I 
j 11 
c.., X.. > 0 lj ID -
For this problem, it is well known [6] that a set of prices exists that will 
support the optimal assignment. Further, neither the optimal assignment nor 
the set of supporting prices will be necessarily unique. Finally, given a set 
of supporting prices, the optimal assignment can be sustained by a competitive 
market. At the optimal assignment, the total (private) valuation of transac-
tion is maximal, and no bidder regrets his choice at the supporting prices. 1 
It is important to distinguish between a set of prices that sustains an 
optimal assignment to (1) and the set of prices determined via a competitive 
mechanism. Demand prices associated with deterministic auctions are minimal 
supporting prices. In general commodity prices obtained in the solutions to 
(1) will not be minimal, due to the symmetric role of the prices associated 
with (lb) and (lc). 
A. Single Purchase Auctions. We now develop the demand price solution. Call 
the commodity prices p_. and the earned surpluses w^. In what follows we develc 
a transportation problem that solves the auction allocation and unambiguously 
Pareto efficiency of the optimal assignment to sellers can be assured by 
making them at the same time bidders. Their reserve prices can be introduced 
as c „ in the appropriate columns of their expanded valuation matric C. If a 
seller is awarded an object, no transaction takes place; otherwise the minimal 
sale price is his reserve price. 
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determines the associated demand prices. The solution properties (2) are pre-
sented for the case in which bidder valuations are interconnected; that is, no 
12 
degeneracies exist in the BUY - BID sets defined below. To characterize the 
problem formally, let: 
BUY = {(i,j)/i buys object j} 
BID = {(i,j)/i is the highest unsuccessful bidder on object j} 
I = (the set of bidders in the auction} ={l,...,m} 
J = {the set of objects beinn auctioned}={ 1,... ,n} 
so that 
(2a) P = max (c. . - W . ) For all j e J 
: 3-D i 
i c I 
s.t. (i,j) 4 B U Y 
(2b) ŵ ^ = 0 For all i| (i,j) BUY for some j 
(2c) c.. = w. + P. For all (i,j) e BUY or BID 
ID I : 
(2d) w i ' p j — 0 F o r a 1 1 i e x» J E J 
(2e) If (i,j) £ BUY then (i,t) ij: BUY and (s,j) I BUY; for all s e I, t e J. 
Each bidder acts to maximize his owned earned surplus which is equal to 
zero if he obtains no object in the auction (2b). The selling price is set 
equal to the highest unsuccessful bid on any object (2a,c) subject to the sin-
gle purchase limit (2e). Demand prices can be seen to be minimal: Suppose 
(p_.,ŵ ,X) is a demand price solution. For expositional purposes renumber the 
objects and bidders so that the BUY set is (i,i). (That is, the awardees are 
associated with the main diagonal of the valuation matrix C.) From (2c) 
12 
In linear programming degeneracy can be resolved via standard solution 
techniques. In this context a degeneracy is said to exist for a proper subset 
K J, k^J if 
1 1 = {i/(i,j) E BUY iel, jeK} 
1 2 = {i/(i,j) e BID iel, jeK} 
and 1 = 1 . 
1 2 
2 0 5 
c = p + w and c . = p. + w, for some k e I, k ^ i. Arbitrarily, assume 
ii *i i kx 1 k 
that a lower supporting price, p , exists for the first object p^ = p^ - 6. 
Since One's earned surplus is increased by 6, his bids on any other object 
would be lower by 6. Let (k ,1) be the associated member of BID. To accept 
p his earned surplus must be correspondingly higher by the amount 6, which 
implies p = c - w = p - 6. Similarly, for (k ,k )EBID this implies 
kl k l , 1 kl k l 
p = p - 6, etc. Due to nondegeneracv, this eventuallv implies that w = <5, k 2 k 2 k-
(k,j) i BUY for any j, which contradicts (2b), or that p^^ < 0 which contra-
dicts (2d) . Demand prices are thus the minimal support prices consistent with 
(2) . 
It will be useful to modify problem (2) to have z objects and z bidders, 
where z = max [m,n+l] . This is done by adding bidders or objects as needed 
with c.. = 0 for i > m, j > n. In an obtained solution, if s is allocated an 
object t and s > m, then this object is not actuallv purchased. Similarly, 
if t > n then bidder s does not actually purchase any object. We show later 
that when c . = 0 for (s,t) eBUY then w = 0 and p = 0 . Problem (2) now has st s t 
m = n = z; constraints (2a) - (2e) still apply and will hold for the original 
problem if they hold for the modified problem. 
Now consider the following minimization problem: 
z-1 z 
(3a) min z I p. + (z-1) Z w. 
j-1 1 i-1 1 
(3b) s.t. w. + p. > c.. for i c Z and j e Z 
I J — 13 
where Z = {l,...,z}. 
We will show that the solution to problem (3) will yield the solution to 
problem (2). Before doing this we present the dual problem of (3). If we 
associate with each constraint (3b) a dual variable ., then the dual problem 
is: 
z z 
(4a) Max Z Z c.. X. IN IT I 1 J J 
(4b) s.t. IX.. = z-1 For all i e Z 
j=l l j 
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z 
(4c) z For all j E Z - {z} 
z 
(4d) I X. 
i=l 1 
0 
(4e) X. . > 0 
1 3 -
For all i E Z and j E Z. 
Note that (3) , (4) represent a transportation problem and its dual. 
We now show the equivalence of problems (2) and (3) : 
Lemma 1: Any basic solution to the dual problem (4) will have two tight 
cells in each of the first z-1 columns of the coefficient matrix, C, and one 
tight cell in column z. 
Proof: By tight we mean that X. . is in the basis and w. + p. = c. .. 
1 3 I 3 13 
Since (4) is a transportation problem with integer right-hand sides, X „ will 
be integer values and X. . 0 from (4e) . By (4b) the largest value of X. . in 
13 " 13 
any column j must be < z-1 but E X. . = z from (4e) for all but column z. This 
i=l 1 3 
implies at least two tight cells in the first z-1 columns. Since this is a 
transportation problem, there will be at least one tight cell in column z. 
This accounts for at least 2 (n-1) + 1 = 2n-l tight cells but this is also the 
maximum number of tight cells in a transportation problem. Hence the Lemma. 
Lemma 2 : At the optional solution to the primal-dual problem (3)-(4) if 
we set w = 0, for s| (s, z) E BUY, then w. >_ 0 and p. >_ 0, for all i,j. s 1 3 
Proof: By const uction the matrix C contains at least one column, z, of 
zeros. Since the purchase of (contrived) object z by person s implies (s,z)e 
BUY, then w_ = 0. (We can set this value because of the one degree of freedom 
in the transportation problem.) Since w s + P z = °» follows that = 0. 
But since w . + p > 0, we have that w. > 0 for all i E Z. Also w + p. > c > 0 x z — 1 — s 1 — sj — 
so that p. _> 0 for all j E Z. 
Proofs In the modified z by z problem all bidders real and contrived will 
purchase an object (real or contrived). If s is the participant who acquires 
S 
3 — 
Lemma 3: Solving (3)-(4) and setting w = 0 for S|(S,Z)EBUY implies (2b). 
item z, then (s,z) is tight and w = 0. Since p > 0 and w > 0 we know that 
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w v = 0. Therefore, for all persons who do not purchase the original n items, 
w. = 0 which satisfies (2b). l 
Before proceeding it is necessary to show a mechanism for determining the 
sets BUY and BID from the solution to (3)-(4). Because of the tree structure 
of the optimal solution, we can find a row or column of C such that (i,j) is a 
singleton titht cell. Let (i,j) E BUY and eliminate row i and column j from 
consideration. Because the integrity of the tree structure is maintained by 
this operation, we can find another singleton cell in some row or column and 
continue the process, until each row and column has a cell assigned to BUY. 
Once BUY is determined, BID is the set of tight cells in C which are not con-
tained in BUY. The set BUY at the same time identified the optimal solution to 
the assignment problem (1), where . = 1 for (i,j) e BUY (x_ = 0 otherwise). 
While the optimum allocations are identical for the problems (1) and (4), the 
supporting prices are in general different, with the demand prices p^ asso-
ciated with (3)-(4) minimal. 
Lemma 4: The solution to (3) with w = 0 for (s,z) tiqht satisfies (2a) , s 
(2c) and (2e) . 
Proof: (2c) and (2e) follow from the construction of the sets BUY and 
BID from tight cells of the C matrix. (2a) follows since c . = w + p. for 
U3 u j 
(u,j) E BID and since w. + p. > c. . for i,j i BUY we have p . = c . - w > c . . - w . 
i j — xj T j u;j u — 1 3 1 
for all i| (i,j) A BUY. Therefore, p. = max (c. . - w.) 
j 13 1 
i| U,j) 
I BUY 
which completes the Lemma. 
Theorem 1: The optimum solution to (3)-(4) yields the minimal demand 
price solution of problem (2). 
Proof: This theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 1 through 4. The 
existence of a solution to transportation problems of the tyoe (3)-(4) assures 
a solution to (2) . It should be noted that alternate optimum allocations could 
exist for (3)-(4) but that the dual variables (demand prices and earned surplus) 
will remain unchanged as long as w^ = 0 for (i,z) e BUY. 
B. Multiple Purchase Auctions. Consider now an auction in which each bidder i 
has the option of purchasing ĝ ^ objects, g i <_ z. This entails a change in con-
dition (2e) of the original auction problem: 
293 
(2e') If (i,j) e BUY, then (s,j) I BUY and there are at most a -1 additional 
allocations (i,t) c BUY, t e J. 
It is also necessary to note that each object purchased by individual i has 
its own earned surplus. We call w the earned surplus of the v*"'1 object 
awarded to i, as defined in (6) below. The multiple purchase auction is charac-
terized by 2(a)-2(d) as amended by (6), and (2e'). Denote this problem as (2 1). 
Its solution is obtained in two stages. First, the optimal allocation is deter-
mined via an analogous transportation problem to (4) , where again z = [max M, 
n + 1] : 
z z 




(5b) s.t. E X.. = 1 For all j e 2 - {z} 
i=l 1 3 
Z 
(5c) E X . . = g. For all i e Z 
3=1 1 3 
z 
(5d) E x . = Eg. - z + 1 
i=l 1 2 
(5e) c. ., X. . > 0 For all i and j e Z 
13 1 3 ~ 
The solution to this transportation problem gives the optimal assignment 
of objects to bidders, denoted X. .. However, the solution does not yield demand 
13 
prices, since an individual purchasing several objects is "forced" in (5) to 
have the same earned surplus on each object. A new extended coefficient matrix, 
constructed from the optimal assignment X^., is needed to allow for inframar-
ginal earnings by any bidder. Then associated (minimal) commodity prices are 
demand prices. 
z-1 
For each i, such that E x . . = n. < g. create n. new rows i 
J = 1 13 i - i 
such that v e V(i), V(i) = {1,2 n.} in the following way: If 
(i,j) is the u t h cell (u e V(i)) of row i such that X.. = 1 then 
13 
(6) let c. . = c. .. Also let c. . = 0 for v e V(i) - {u}. Finally i 3 13 1 3 u v 
let c. . = c.. for all v e V(i) for all (i,j) such that X.. = 0 
or j = z. 299 
This extended coefficient matrix (6) can be solved for demand prices according 
to (2)-(4). We now show the equivalence of this solution (6) to the desired 
solution (2') . 
Lemma 5: For each X^. = 1 in the optimum solution to problem (5), the 
corresponding cell (i j) will be a cell in BUY in the optimum solution of (6) , 
V , 
where (i,j) is the v t h cell in row i such that x\ . = 1. 
Proof: Let S be the set (i i) where (i j) is the v t h cell in row i such 
v v 
that X.. = 1 at the optimum solution to (5). It is easv to show that the set 
S satisfies the allocation properties of the set BUY (i.e., constraint 2e) 
for the extended matrix (6). This fact follows directly from the construction 
of matrix (6) in such a fashion that only.one cell of S is located in any row 
or column of (6) . It remains to be shown that the set S offers the optimal 
allocation of all objects to be auctioned. Assume that this is not true and 
that some other set, T, offers an allocation of resources with a strictly 
greater value for lEc..X... Because the set T has at most one cell in each row 
JO JO 
and colomn of (6), T also provides a solution to the original matrix (5) where 
X.. = 1 for each (i j) e T. But if T yields a larger objective function for 
l] v 
(6), it must also represent a solution for (5) whose objective function is 
greater than the original optimum solution used to form S. This fact is clearly 
a contradiction, hence the Lemma. 
Theorem 2: The solution to problem (5) yields a solution to problem (2 1). 
From Lemma 5, the solution to problem (6) yields a solution to constraints 
(2a) through (2e). Note that for (2a): 
P. = max (c. . - w. ) for all j e J 3 l : l . v v 
i e l v 
(i i) i BUY 
IF 1 
with I being the indices of the expanded set of rows, and w. the earned sur-
th V plus of bidder i derived from the v object which he has been awarded. Since 
c . = 0 for all but one of the set V(i), (i awarded to j) this constraint 
V 
yields the multiple purchase analoqv to (2a). Similar interpretations hold for 
each of the other constraints. In particular, constraint (2e) in the expanded 300 
rramework of problem (6) implies (2e') and the theorem is proved. 
The foregoing analvsis provides solutions to deterministic auctions when 
bidders face no resource constraints. Before turning to that case we note that 
the solutions obtained apolv to both progressive and sealed bid auctions (see 
Appendix) . In either case, rational bidder behavior entails bidding one's full 
valuations (c^_j) , knowing that demand prices determined according to (2)-(6) 
for commodities will be minimal, subject to any purchase limits in the auction. 
C Single Purchase Auctions with Resource Constraints. Since an auction takes 
place at a given point in time (P2) bidder resource limits can affect the auc-
tion outcome, in view of (P5) . With the introduction of resource constraints, 
bidders again act to maximize their earned surpluses, but can bid no more than 
their resources, , permit. The additional complexity of this auction situ-
ation cannot be resolved bv the linear proqramming methods of section 4A, even 
though nonlinear problems analogous to (2)-(3) describe the solution properties 
of such auctions. Demand prices are again minimal, given the resource con-
straints, but neither the allocation nor the earned surpluses are now unique. 
In general more than one Pareto optimal allocation exists for this auction prob-
lem. These Pareto optimal allocations are associated with Kuhn-Tucker points 1 3 
of the nonlinear model. Solutions are obtained via an algorithm based on the 
Dutch auction procedure, and are verified by the solution properties of the 
nonlinear model. 
Formallv the auction problem is similar to (2) , with the additional stipu-
lation that no bidder i can bid more than his resource limit M.. Conditions 
l 
(2b)-(2e) still apply. An additional condition, 
(2f*) P. < M. for all (i,j) e BUY 
3 - i 
limits transaction prices. Finally, condition (2a) which defines demand prices 
must be modified to reflect the fact that bidder resources limit the price de-
termining bids: 
(2a*) P. = max (min(c. - w.,M.)] 
3 13 1 1 
k l 
(i,j) t BUY. 
See Mangasarian [8] . 
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This auction problem is referred to as (2*). Following the development of Sec-
tion A, the modified z x z problem consists of (3a) and (3b*): 
(3b*) w. + p. > min (c.., M. + w. ) , for all (i,j) E Z . 
i n — n i l 
This problem is referred to as (3*). Now consider an auction allocation and 
associated prices (X,p,w) that satisfy (2*) or (3*) . If we let d = min 
(c..,M. + w.) , it is easv to show that the lemmata and Theorem 1 of section 4A 
13 i i 
apply at that solution point. The new constraint (2f*) is satisfied since: 
w. + p. = d. . = min (c. ., M. + w.) for (i,j) e BUY 
i 3 1 3 n i l 
if c.. > M. + w. then w. + o. = M. + w. and o. = M. 
13 — 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 
if c.. < M. + w. then w. + p. = c.. < M. + w. and D . < M.. 
i] — i 1 1 : 1 3 - 1 1 3 — 1 
Thus the solution properties of (3*) conform to those of the desired solu-
tion (2*) . However (3*) is difficult to solve, since the constraints (3b*) do 
not define a convex region. To obtain solutions, we resort to an algorithm 
14 
that is based on the Dutch auction procedure: 
Begin with a vector of arbitrarily high commodity prices p. and let these 
prices fall, simultaneously or one at a time. Each price drops until two bids 
are registered, at which time the price is set equal to the second highest bid 
and the object is temporarily awarded to the highest bidder. At any time in 
the bidding process each participant i is willing to bid c - w^ on object j, 
where is his present (assured) earned surplus, provided this amount does not 
exceed his resources M^. Once the price on object j is set, it will only begin 
to drop again if one of the two hiqh bids is retracted. A bid may be retracted 
by a participant only after the temporary award of an object to that partici-
pant. A rational bidder will retract all bids on objects which if awarded at 
the present price will not provide as much earned surplus as some alternative. 
If an award is the second object awarded, one of the bids on the two awarded 
objects must be retracted. When no one is willing to bid further, the bidding 
is stopped and all awards are made final. Note that earned surplus for each 
bidder in the action is a strictly nondecreasing function throughout the auction 
14 
See Appendix for a more detailed description and example of this solu-
tion procedure. 
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orocess. It is obvious that when the algoithmm stops the present solution i 
Pareto optimal and that this solution satisfies both (2*) and (3*). It is easv 
to show that this point is also associated with a Kuhn-Tucker solution. To 
show this fact, resolve the problem with constant right-hand sides d = min 
' Cij' Mi + Wi^ f ° r ^ ' ^ * T h e r e s u l t l n 9 Kuhn-Tucker solution found using 
the transportation problem (3)-(4) of section 4A is equivalent to that using 
the auction algorithm just described. 
While the solution procedure just described yields a Pareto optimal allo-
cation, all bidders may not be satisfied with the auction outcome. Bidder dis-
satisfaction cannot occur in the unconstrained case. The underlying reason for 
this phenomenon is that alternate (Kuhn-Tucker) allocations can be supported by 
the (minimal) demand prices, and at the same time, the earned surplus attached 
to these allocations can differ. Specifically, a bidder may be able to afford 
an object at its final transaction price, and were he to obtain the object, in-
crease his earned surplus. When the situation occurs, the price of the desired 
object just equals the bidder's resource limit. We call this occurrence bidder 
regret. To illustrate the occurrence of bidder regret in resource constrained 
auctions, we offer the following single example: Assume there are three bid-
ders, each of which can bid for one of two objects. The evaluation of each ob-
ject by the bidders and their resource constraints are qiven below. 

















The following two auction outcomes are possible. (The awards are circled, 
prices are listed across the top and earned surplus along the side.) The un-
constrained outcome is also given. 
2 1 
2 4 1 
1 4 2 







1 3 1 
1 1 4 1 
2 1 4 2 
1 O i l 
Unconstrained Solution 
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The first solution is obtained in the following way: When the price of the 
first object falls to 2, both bidders One and Two submit a bid, with the tem-
porary award made to One- It is then never in One's interest to relinquish his 
purchase riqhts, and although Two would like to bid up to 3 for object one he 
cannot because of his resource constraint. This situation leads bidder Two to 
bid only 2 units for this object and therefore lose the award at a price he is 
willing to pay. One measure of his regret is the difference between his earned 
surplus and his surplus had he been awarded object two, i.e., c -p -w =1. If 
21 1 2 
p^ had been strictly greater than 2 bidder Two's lost earned surplus would arise 
from his lack of resources—not the allocation mechanism; this of course cannot 
be construed as regret. In the second solution, bidder Two is awarded the 
first object. Bidder One is willing to bid 2 units on the first object and 1 
on the second object. Yet bidder One obtains no object in the auction and thus 
incurs regret. In the unconstrained case if a participant was willing to bid 
for an object, but did not receive the object, then his bid (evaluation) set 
the price. This bidder's loss of earned surplus which resulted from not beinq 
awarded the object would have been zero. In the constrained case the same situ-
ation can occur with a nonzero loss of earned surplus, hence regret.^ 
The allocation rule determining the temporary awards in resource constraint 
auctions can be crucial to the outcome. In a progressive auction, the first 
bidder recognized could be designated the awardee, or alternatively, a fair coin 
16 
could be used to break ties. Still, this class of auctions is deterministic 
in the sense that rational bidders will submit their full valuations of objects, 
knowing that the allocation procedure will guarantee minimal transaction prices 
and a Pareto optimal outcome. 
" i n this example, if One's resources were slightly larger then only the 
first solution would result. Similarly, if Two was slightlv wealthier, the 
second solution would be assured. It might appear, then, that this situation 
would induce bidders to gather information and generate qame strategies that in-
crease the probability of their receiving an object. For assume that a bidder 
knows with certainty that he will tie for the high bid on an object at a price 
equal to his resource constraint, but less than his evaluation. The individual 
strategy would be to bid more than his resources allow in order to assure the 
first bid. The price would be set by the other bidder at the price he could 
just afford. However, in the absence of collusion, the possibilitv of reciprocal 
behavior by other bidders, and the cost of reneging on an award (P5) would rule 
out such behavior. 




Auction procedures play an important role in financial markets, particu-
larly in the issuance of new securities. At present, participation in such 
auctions requires considerable expertise, includincr a knowledqe of the likely 
behavior of other bidders in the market. The information recruirements and the 
inherent risks involved in those probabilistic auctions limit the extent of 
direct bidder participation, calling forth the need for tradinq specialists and 
secondary markets for final demand distribution. The efficiency of these finan-
cial institutions has been the subject of a prolonged debate. As the technology 
for storing and transmitting information improves, deterministic auctions in-
volving remote bidding by direct investors could become a viable alternative. 
This paper has been concerned with deriving the solution properties of deter-
ministic auctions. 
We have construed deterministic auctions as a set of assignment problems 
that can be solved via linear programming methods. The crucial property of 
these auction solutions is that the resultinq commodity prices—demand prices— 
are minimal. This solution propertv induces full valuation bidding and in-
creased bidder participation in the auction. Demand price solutions are ob-
tained via bidding rules based on the Dutch auction procedure, or via a trans-
portation problem formulation of the auction. Both solution methods yield the 




Here we present example solutions to the deterministic auction considered 
in sections 4A, B, and C. Solutions are presented for both single and multiple 
purchase auctions of dissimilar commodities according to (2)-(6), and for a 
single purchase resource constrained auction. These solutions correspond to 
the outcomes of sealed bid auctions, wherein bidders submit their full valua-
tions, c^j» °f t n e offered commodities. In addition we present an equivalent 
solution procedure for progressive auctions. This procedure, to be described 
now, is an extended version of the modified Dutch Auction of Vickrey [12]. 
A. By way of introduction we recall the progressive auction described by Vick-
rey for a single object. In this case the price starts at an arbitrarily high 
value. As it is lowered participants submit bids at whatever price desired. 
The price continues downward until the second highest bid has been placed.^ 
The object is sold to the highest bidder but at a price equal to the second 
highest bid. This procedure provides no incentives on the part of bidders to 
bid other than their honest evaluations of the object. 
In the multiple commodity auction, a vector of prices is announced at an 
arbitrarily high value. Each price, of course, corresponds to an object up for 
auction. The prices are then lowered in any manner whatever—one at a time, 
all at once or at different rates. As the price of an object drops, bids are 
placed on that object. Bidders are allowed to place bids on as many objects as 
they ish, regardless of the number they can ultimately purchase. Rational be-
havior dictates that a bid be placed on any object whose price, p_., reaches the 
value of the object to the individual, c... As soon as two bids on the same 
10 
object have been made, the highest bidder is informed that he has been tempo-
rarily assigned that object at a price egual to the second highest bidder. The 
price stops dropping at that time. No knowledge of objects assigned is provided 
to anyone but the highest bidder. At that time the highest bidder essentially 
knows that a minimum value for his earned surplus will be w = c. . - p .. As 
i 10 3 
the bidding continues, a bidder may reach a point where he has the highest bid 
of at least two bids on q. + 1 objects, only g^ of which he can obtain. He 
will, therefore, retract his bid on the object which gives him the smallest 
earned surplus. He will also retract bids on other objects not yet awarded to 
him which would not at their present prices increase his earned surplus. This 
No bidder knows if another has bid. This could be accomplished by elec-
tronic signalling devices that register on a board viewed onlv by the auction-
eer. 
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act could b e done automatically without interaction from the bidder. The prices 
» those objects with retracted bids will then start drooping once again until 
i new second bid is received. The retraction of bids is the necessary modifica-
tion needed in the solution of multiple commodity auctions. Because bids may 
be retracted on objects, bidders have incentives to bid even when it is kowwn 
that a hiqher bidder exists. Note that since the price stops as soon as two 
bids have been made on an object and starts only when one is retracted, there 
are at m o s t two bidders on each object. when there are exactly two bids on 
each o b j e c t , the auction stops. At this point it is easy to verify that con-
straints (2a)-(2d) and (2e') are satisfied. Ties in this process must be broken 
by some device, random or otherwise. Multiple bidders at a Drice are maintained 
in a q u e u e which is drawn upon as bids are retracted. It should be noted that 
in the c a s e of a tie in this situation one bidder is awarded the object, while 
the other determines the price. Because of the tie the earned surplus on this 
object is zero for the winning bid, and both bidders are therefore indifferent 
about t h e award. 
As i n single object auctions, there is no incentive to deviate from full 
valuation bidding. Not retracting bids or submitting false bids only serves 
to keep some objects at a higher than minimum price. This can only induce cer-
tain b i d d e r s to bid higher on still other objects so that in the long run all 
prices w i l l remain high. In the case of many ties at a particular price, sub-
aitting a slightly higher price may assure the bidder of purchasing the object 
but at a price where the bidder is indifferent to the award. This strategy 
yields a negative expected return to the bidder since it is possible to be the 
buyer o f the object at a nrice in excess of value. 
We now present solutions to an example problem. First a single purchase 
solution corresponding to (2), (3), (4) is given. Sealed bids equal to 
z (i = 1,...4; j = 1,...3) are shown below: 
3-3 
10 12 14 0 3 The riqht-hand sides of (4b)-
(4d) are shown around the edae 
17 20 13 0 3 of the C matrix. Each partici 
14 16 15 0 3 pant may purchase at most one 
12 10 3 0 3 item. 
4 4 4 0 
I .-•«„ fields- tight constraints are circled, the The transportation problem solution yields, tign 
I a 4n the upper left-hand corner of each cell, optimal values of X. . are displayed in the upper 
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act could be done automatically without interaction from the bidder. The prices 
on those objects with retracted bids will then start dropping once again until 
a new second bid is received. The retraction of bids is the necessary modifica-
tion needed in the solution of multiple commodity auctions. Because bids may 
be retracted on objects, bidders have incentives to bid even when it is kowwn 
that a higher bidder exists. Note that since the price stops as soon as two 
bids have been made on an object and starts only when one is retracted, there 
are at most two bidders on each object. When there are exactly two bids on 
each object, the auction stops. At this point it is easy to verify that con-
straints (2a)-(2d) and (2e') are satisfied. Ties in this process must be broken 
by some device, random or otherwise. Multiple bidders at a price are maintained 
in a queue which is drawn upon as bids are retracted. It should be noted that 
in the case of a tie in this situation one bidder is awarded the object, while 
the other determines the price. Because of the tie the earned surplus on this 
object is zero for the winning bid, and both bidders are therefore indifferent 
about the award. 
As in single object auctions, there is no incentive to deviate from full 
valuation bidding. Not retracting bids or submitting false bids only serves 
to keep some objects at a higher than minimum price. This can only induce cer-
tain bidders to bid higher on still other objects so that in the long run all 
prices will remain high. In the case of many ties at a particular price, sub-
mitting a sliqhtly higher price may assure the bidder of purchasing the object 
but at a price where the bidder is indifferent to the award. This strategy 
yields a negative expected return to the bidder since it is possible to be the 
buyer of the object at a price in excess of value. 
We now present solutions to an example problem. First a single purchase 
solution corresponding to (2), (3), (4) is given. Sealed bids equal to 
. (i = 1,...4; j = 1, 3) are shown below: 
1 3 
10 12 14 0 3 The riqht-hand sides of (4b)-
(4d) are shown around the edge 
17 20 13 0 3 of the C matrix. Each partici 
14 16 15 0 3 pant may purchase at most one 
12 10 3 0 3 item. 
4 4 4 0 
The transportation problem solution yields: tight constraints are circled, the 




12 14 13 0 
1 10 12 14 0 
6 17 20 13 0 
2 14 16 15 0 
0 12 10 3 0 
To determine the set BUY assign first the singleton column 4 to participant 4. 
Then assign the new singleton in column 1, created by the removal of row 4, to 
participant 3. This process continues until the set BUY is determined: 
BUY ={(1,3); (2,2); (3,1); (4,4)}. 
We now solve the problem via the modified Dutch auction framework. Start 
the price vector at p = (25,25,25). To reduce confusion assume that the prices 
fall one at a time. The following bidding progression results: 
p = (17,25,25) 
P = (14,25,25) 
Participant 2 bids 17 for object 1. 
Participant 3 bids 14 for object 1: setting its 
price. Participant 2 is awarded object 1 and 
achieves an earned surnlus of 3. 
P Falls 
p = (14,17,25) 
p = (14,16,25) 
Participant 2 bids 17 = 20 - 3 for object 2. 
Participant 3 bids 16 for object 2: setting its 
price. Participant 2 is awarded the object who 
retracts his bid on object 1 and accepts object 
2 with an earned surplus of 4. 
P Falls 
p = (14,16,15) 
p = (14,16,14) 
Participant 3 bids 15 for object 3. 
Participant 1 bids 14 for object 3: setting its 
price. Object 3 is awarded to participant 3 whose 
earned surplus is 1. Ke therefore retracts his 
bids on objects 1 and 2. 
P 3 Falls 
P = (13,16,14) Participant 3 bids 13 for object 1. Participant 2 
bids 13 for object 1. The price is set at 13 and 
awarded to either 2 or 3 who are both indifferent 
at this point. We assume that neither participant 
accepts the object. 
P Falls 
p = (13,15,14) Participant 3 bids 15 for object 2. This sets the 
price for the object and increases participant 2's 
earned surplus to 5. 
P 2 Falls 
(13,15,14) Participant 3 bids 13 for object 1. 
(12,15,14) Participants 4 and 2 bid 12 for object 1, setting 
its price. Object 1 is awarded to participant 3 
whose earned surplus is now 2. He therefore retracts 
his bid on objects 2 and 3. 
P Falls 
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P = (12,14,14) Participant 3 bids 14 for object 2. The object is 
still awarded to participant 2 whose earned surplus Falls 
is now 6. Participant 2 retracts his bid for object 2 
1. (This price remains fixed since participant 4 
also bid 12.) 
P = (12,14,13) Participant 3 bids 13 for object 3. The object is 
awarded to participant 1. All objects are awarded P 3 Falls 
and the bidding stops. 
T h e solution is seen to be equivalent to that derived from (2)-(4) above. 
We now solve the original problem subject to the condition that each par-
ticipant may purchase up to two objects. The progressive auction process is 
similar to the one described above and will not be given. Problem 5 is shown 
below, with the right-hand sides listed around the edge of the matrix. The 
solution is shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell whose ? 0. 
10 12 14 0 2 
17 20 13 0 2 
14 16 15 0 2 
12 10 3 0 2 
1 1 1 5 
P r o b l e m (6) derived from the above solution is 
P. = 
1 13 15 14 0 0 
w. = 
0 10 12 14 0 0 
4 17 0 13 0 0 
(bidder 2) 
5 0 20 13 0 0 
1 14 16 15 0 0 
0 12 10 3 0 0 
To l o c a t e the optimal assignment, either look for singleton columns or use the 
s o l u t i o n to (5); BUY = {(1,4); (2,1); (2,2); (3,3)}. 
B . A n example of a single purchase auction situation with bidder resource con-





1 2 3 
1 6 2 3 3 
2 5 4 1 2 
3 3 4 2 2 
4 0 1 1 none 
The bidding algorithm is listed below, all prices start at 10. 
p = (3,10,10) Participant 1 bids 3 units for object 1. He 
cannot bid more because of his resource constraint. 
P, Falls —  p = (2,10,10) Bidder 2 and 3 both bid 2 units for object 1 thus 1 
setting its price. One of the two bids sets the 
price. Participant 1 now has a guaranteed earned 
surplus of 4. 
p = (2,2,10) Participants 2 and 3 both bid 2 units for object 2. 
The tie is broken by some mechanism in favor of P^ Falls 
say 2. The price is set by bidder 3. 
p = (2,2,2) Participant 3 bids 2 units for object 3. 
p = (2,2,1) Participant 4 bids 1 unit for object 3 and sets 
the price. All prices are now set. 
P 3 Falls 
The earned surpluses are, w = (4,2,10). The amount of regret incurred by bid-
ders is a function of the way in which ties are broken. In a sealed bid auc-
tion in which all bidder evaluations are known, ties could be broken so as to 
minimize total regret. 
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